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 SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2440
 E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PARM, NATO
 SUBJ: MBFR: MISSION THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION
 VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
 REF: BONN 7169

SUMMARY: MISSION BELIEVES THAT GIVEN STRONG FRG RESERVATIONS ON A RELATIVELY ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, NOW RECONFIRMED BY REFTEL, U.S. SHOULD NOW UNDERTAKE CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO SOME ELEMENTS THEREOF. AS MISSION SEES IT, U.S. HAS BASIC CHOICE OF EITHER BASING LONG TERM VERIFICATION SYSTEM LARGELY ON NTM, OR OF FINDING WAYS IN WHICH THE OVERT SYSTEM COULD BE TAILORED TO MEET AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF GERMAN CONCERNS, WHILE RETAINING ITS ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSES. THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO STIMULATE THINKING ON SUBJECT AND SUGGESTS SOME ILLUSTRATIVE WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT PROCEED TO ADOPT OUR CURRENT POSITION. END SUMMARY

1. IN VIEW OF FRG'S STRONGLY HELD RESERVATIONS ON A RELATIVELY ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, MISSION BELIEVES U.S. WILL HAVE TO DECIDE VERY SHORTLY WHETHER:

A. WE ARE IN ESSENCE PREPARED TO ABANDON LARGE ELEMENTS OF AN INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR MBFR (ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO MONITORING POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS) THUS RELYING LARGELY ON NTM BUT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME STATIC POINTS AT EXIT POINTS TO VERIFY WITHDRAWALS (PER RUTHS'S LATEST COMMENTS IN REFTEL; OR

B. WHETHER WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE OVERT SYSTEM ALONG LINES OF THE ONE DEVELOPED IN THE U.S. OCTOBER 5 PAPER.

2. IF WE ARE TO PURSUE OPTION (A) THE CURRENT STATE OF FRG THINKING OFFERS US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT OUR POSITION GRADUALLY IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE NARROWLY FOCUSED APPROACH TO VERIFICATION. SUCH A CHOICE WOULD PROBABLY HELP US ON OTHER ISSUES WITH THE FRG AND SERVE TO INCREASE THE NEGOTIABILITY OF AN OVERALL MBFR AGREEMENT WITH

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THE EAST, IT WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, INTRODUCE IMPORTANT DIFFICULTIES FOR A NUMBER OF OTHER INTEREST ALLIES (E.G., UK, BELGIUM/NETHERLANDS).
 3. IF ON THE OTHER HAND WASHINGTON WISHES TO MOVE FORWARD ON OPTION (B), MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE WILL SHORTLY HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH AND ACCOMMODATE OUR PREFERENCES ON AN OVERT SYSTEM TO THE FRG'S STRONG RESERVATIONS AND CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE TEAMS, WHICH PER REFTTEL, NOW APPEAR TO US AS HARDENING OF BONN'S POSITION. OTHERWISE, A LONG-DRAWN OUT DEADLOCK MAY ENSUE IN WHICH A SIGNIFICANTLY MORE RESERVED POSITION TOWARD MBFR MAY AFFECT U.S. ABILITY TO REACH UNDERSTANDINGS WITH BONN ON OTHER ISSUES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
 4. AS THE MISSION UNDERSTOOD INITIAL U.S. THINKING ABOUT VERIFICATION

THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE U.S. WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. AS THE GERMANS PERCEIVE IT (AND HAVE OCCASIONALLY REMINDED US), THE U.S. IS NOW A STRONG ADVOCATE OF OVERT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE NON-NEGOTIABLE WITH THE WARSAW PACT BUT WHICH, IF ACCEPTED BY THE PACT, WOULD POSE SEVERE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE FRG. IT NOW SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THE GERMANS WILL PERSIST IN THIS UNDERLYING ATTITUDE WHICH WILL COLOR THEIR THINKING ABOUT VERIFICATION. THIS, IN TURN, WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO STRIKE A REASONABLE COMPROMISE WITH BONN, AND ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO IF WE CONTINUE TO ASK FOR THE FULL GAUMUT OF VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WHICH WE HAVE LAID BEFORE THE ALLIES.

5. IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION THAT THE MOST DEFICIENT PART OF THE GERMAN POSITION, IN TERMS OF OBTAINING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, IS THE GERMAN SUGGESTION THAT OVER VERIFICATION COULD BE DISPENSED WITH ONCE WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. AS WASHINGTON HAS OFTEN POINTED OUT, AND AS THE MISSION HAS UNDERSCORED IN ITS DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH THE ALLIES, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES THAT RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT THE AGREED CEILINGS. THEREFORE, THE MISSION SUGGESTS THAT WE SEEK TO OBTAIN SOME GERMAN MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WHICH WOULD COMMIT BONN TO SOME FORM OF OVERT VERIFICATION IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL PHASE.

6. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE WAYS TO MEET GERMAN CONCERNS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GERMAN IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES CITED BY WASHINGTON IN RECENT GUIDANCE, COULD BE MODIFIED IN WAYS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT LESS OBJECTIONABLE. TO

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ILLUSTRATE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, THE WEST MIGHT ASK FOR A CERTAIN QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. THIS WOULD CORRESPOND ROUGHLY TO THE GERMAN IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WARSAW PACT TO ADMIT INSPECTORS FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT THAT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE BE PRODUCED BY THE NATO COUNTRIES. WE COULD INDICATE PRIVATELY THAT THIS APPROACH IS IN FACT A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE TYPE OF FORMAL MOBILE TEAM ACTIVITY WE HAVE HERETOFORE PROPOSED AND WHICH, PER REFTEL, THE GERMANS CONSIDER "UNACCEPTABLE."

7. TO STRENGTHEN OUR NEGOTIATING HAND FURTHER, BOTH VIS-A-VIS THE GERMANS AND ULTIMATELY AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT, THE U.S. COULD, IN ADDITION TO THIS ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEM, PROPOSE A SYSTEM OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF DESIGNATED CONTROL POINTS (I.E., SPECIFIC, CIRCUMSCRIBED GEOGRAPHIC AREAS SURROUNDING TRANSPORTATION CHOKES POINTS) TO WHICH INSPECTORS COULD MOVE AT ANY TIME AND WITH NO RESTRICTION ON FREQUENCY.

8. IF THE U.S. WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS MUCH AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG ON OVERT VERIFICATION, WE WOULD HAVE COME VERY CLOSE TO ACHIEVING THE ESSENTIALS OF WHAT WE ARE PRESENTLY SEEKING. INDEED, WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED MORE, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THAN WE ARE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT. HOWEVER, THERE IS A THIRD ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION WHICH REMAINS TO BE ADDRESSED: THIS IS THE ISSUE OF HOW LONG OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEMS WOULD REMAIN IN GERMAN TERRITORY TO MONITOR POSSIBLE REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.

9. THE GERMAN VIEW, OF COURSE, IS THAT ALL OVERT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY RELIANCE ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ONCE WITHDRAWALS ARE COMPLETED. EVEN IF WE WERE TO SECURE FRG AGREEMENT TO THE DEGREE OF OVERT INSPECTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT APPLY IN PERPETUITY. IN SHORT, ONE OF THE MAIN SELLING POINTS IN PERSUADING THE GERMANS TO ACCEPT OVERT VERIFICATION FOR POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS WILL BE A U.S. ASSURANCE THAT THERE MAY IN TIME BE A PHASING OUT OF INSPECTION SYSTEMS ON GERMAN SOIL.

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10. THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD PROVIDE SUCH ASSURANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD GIVEN THE GERMANS PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT IN PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE OPTIONS OF THE MBFR AGREEMENT, THE U.S. WILL, WITH ITS ALLIES, REVIEW WHETHER THERE IS NECESSITY FOR A CONTINUATION OF OVERT VERIFICATION. THE U.S. COULD PERHAPS GO FURTHER THAN THIS AND PROVIDE THAT OVERT VERIFICATION WOULD BE PHASED OUT AT THE END OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREED TO CONTINUE THE SYSTEM. ALTERNATIVELY, THERE COULD BE PROVISIONS FOR A GRADUAL PHASING OUT OF THE MORE OBTRUSIVE ELEMENT S OF THE SYSTEM, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL AT THE END OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME REPLACE OVERT SYSTEMS OF VERIFICATION.

11. WHATEVER ASSURANCE WE CAN GIVE TO THE FRG IN THIS REGARD WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED AGAINST THE LONG-RUN VIABILITY OF THE MBFR TREATY. IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION, HOWEVER, THA T

SOME ASSURANCES OF THIS KIND WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO SECURE FRG AGREEMENT TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS.

12. WITH REGARD TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS, THE GERMANS ALREADY ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT FOR OVERT VERIFICATION. THE PROBLEM HERE IS TO DESIGN A SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES SOME MEASURE OF MOBILITY WHILE REASSURING THE GERMANS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF OBTRUSIVENESS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE FRG A "SPECIAL ZONE."

13. BENELUX AGREEMENT TO FIXED CONTROL POSTS IN THEIR TERRITORY SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP WITH THE GERMANS ON THE "SPECIAL ZONE" PROBLEM S,

AND ON BASIS OF WHAT GERMANS HAVE SAID, MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE CAN NEGOTIATE WITH THE GERMANS

AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF FIXED CONTROL POSTS. THE REMAINING PROBLEM IS WHETHER WE CAN INTRODUCE MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS INTO THE SYSTEM

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AND, IF SO, IN WHAT WAY. WE THINK IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DO THIS IF ONLY TO AVOID A POSSIBLE DEADLOCK WITH THE U.K. AND BELGIUM/ NETHERLANDS.

14. ONE WAY WOULD BE THROUGH THE TACTICAL DEVICE OF AGREEING TO THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW, I.E., THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE BOTH FIXED AND MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS TO THE SOVIETS AND BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR ONLY FIXED POSTS IF THE WARSAW PACT REJECTS, AS IS LIKELY, MOBILE TEAMS. THE U.S. COULD TRY THIS APPROACH ON THE GERMANS AS A FIRST STEP. THIS APPROACH IS LIKELY THAT WE BE PREPARED TO FALL BACK TO AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE FREQUENCY OF THE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD THEN FORCE THE U.K. AND BENELUX TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR POSITION TO STRONG FRG VIEWS, THUS REMOVING THE U.S. FROM THE CENTER OF CONFRONTATION WITH BONN.

15. WASHINGTON SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEAR IN MIND THAT NTM ISSUE REMAINS HIGH ON FRG LIST OF VERIFICATION ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS, FRG DEL HAS TOLD US CATEGORICALLY THAT BONN MUST HAVE AN INDICATION OF NTM CAPABILITY (AS NOTED IN REFTTEL) BEFORE IT REACHES ANY DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS ON AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING DIFFERENCES WITH FRG GOVERNMENT ON VERIFICATION, WE CANNOT DETERMINE FROM HERE HOW FIRM THIS POSITION IS. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE FRG MILITARY (AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN GENERAL) CONTINUES TO FAVOR AN OVERT SYSTEM ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE MUCH TO GAIN IN ESTABLISHING AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM IN PACT AREAS OF THE NGA, WHEREAS A RECIPROCA

L
DEPLOYMENT OF A PACT INSPECTORATE ON THE NATO SIDE WOULD MERELY LEGALIZE A PROCESS WHICH THE PACT ALREADY ENGAGES IN THROUGH A VARIETY OF WAYS, INCLUDING CLANDESTINE. MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE FRG DEL POINT OUT THAT PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF RESISTANCE TO THE ENVISIONED OVERT SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE EMANATING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, OR CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF.

16. IN ANY CASE, NTM QUESTION WILL STILL BE VERY MUCH ALIVE UNTIL U.S. REACTS. WE DO SEE ANY U.S. ACTION ON NTM AS VERY MUCH OF A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, HOWEVER, SINCE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS OF NTM CAPABILITY WOULD PROBABLY GIVE FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE IN FRG GOVERNMENT FAVORING A MINIMAL OVERT SYSTEM. WHILE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE HOPE WASHINGTON IS GIVING CONSIDERATION OF NTM SHARING QUESTION.

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17. THE MISSION IS ADVANCING THE ABOVE SUGGESTIONS IN THE HOPE THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL CONSIDER MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING GERMAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS, WHICH, AS WE NOTE, COULD EXACERBATE OUR NEGOTATING PROBLEMS WITH THEM ON OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR. THE MISSION IS SUGGESTING ABOVE APPROACHES ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE BASIS AND SIMPLY TO STIMULATE THINKING ON WAYS IN WHICH TO REACH COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRG. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WASHINGTON REACTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED EXPEDITIOUSLY ONCE FRG HAS PUT FORWARD ITS SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER, WHICH WE NOW EXPECT DURING WEEK OF MAY 6. MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE USDEL MBFR'S AND EMBASSY BONN'S COMMENTS. RUMSFELD

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